Nicolo Machiavelli: Aspects of the new prince

Machiavelli's treatise on government was rejected with horror by almost all early readers, but it accurately describes the means which rulers have always used to remain in power. As a pioneering study of practical politics it has often been compared with Kautilya's Arthasastra and the doctrines of the Chinese legalists, such as Han Fei Tzu. But what makes The Prince both more revolutionary and more controversial than either of these is the delight Machiavelli seems to take in scorning conventional morality. Indeed so cynical are such passages as the following that some readers have imagined that he must have been satirizing rather than advocating these ideas. In his work The Prince, he brings out the aspects of a new prince.
According to Machiavelli there are four main attributes that a prince should possess: intelligence, strength, determination, and tenaciousness. A prince must have the smarts to determine right from wrong. In times of trouble, he must know which path to take next. Strength ; a prince must be physically, and emotionally strong to face whatever comes at him. A prince's determination is very crucial in times of hardship. A prince must be willing to push on through the most difficult of times. He also must encourage his people and believe for himself that the struggle will soon be over.
A prince should understood that there are two types of fighting: one with laws and the other with force. The first is most suitable for men, the second is most suitable for beasts, but it often happens that the first is not enough, which requires that we have recourse to the second. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince to know how to act both as a man and as a beast. This was signified allegorically to princes by the ancient writers: they wrote that Achilles and many other ancient princes were given to be raised and tutored by the centaur Chiron, who took custody of them and disciplined them. This can only mean, this trainer who was half beast and half man, that a prince needs to know how to use either one or the other nature, and the one without the other will never last.
Since it is necessary for the prince to use the ways of beasts, he should imitate the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot defend himself from snares and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. Therefore, it is important to be a fox in order to understand the snares and a lion in order to terrify the wolves. Those who choose only to be a lion do not really understand. Therefore, a prudent leader will not and should not observe his promises, when such observance will work against him and when the reasons for making the promise are no longer valid. If all men were good, this precept would not be good; but since men are evil and will not keep their word with you, you shouldn't keep yours to them. Never has a prince lacked legitimate reasons to break faith. This can be shown by an infinite number of examples from modern times, numerous peace treaties and promises that have been broken and made completely empty by the faithlessness of princes: these knew well how to use the ways of the fox, and they are the ones who succeed. But it is necessary to know how to hide this nature and to simulate a good character and to dissimulate: for the majority of men are simple and will only follow the needs of the present, so that the deceiver can always find someone he can deceive. Alexander VI (1) never did or thought about anything else except deceiving people and always found some reason or other to do it. There was never a man who was better at making assurances, or more eager to offer solemn promises, or who kept them less; yet he always succeeded in his deceptions beyond his wildest dreams, because he played his role in the world so well.
Therefore, a prince doesn't need to have all the qualities mentioned earlier, but it is necessary that he appear to have them.
Also having good qualities and always practicing them is harmful, while appearing to practice them is useful. It's good to appear to be pious, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, and it's good to be all those things; but as long as one keeps in mind that when the need arises you can and will change into the opposite. It needs to be understood that a prince, and especially a prince recently installed, cannot observe all those qualities which make men good, and it is often necessary in order to preserve the state to act contrary to faity, contrary to mercy, contrary to humaneness, and contrary to religion. And therefore he needs a spririt disposed to follow wherever the winds of fortune and the variability of affairs leads him. A prince must take great care never to let anything come from his mouth that is not full of the above-mentioned five qualities, and he must appear to all who see and hear him to be completely pious, completely faithful, completely honest, completely humane, and completely religious. And nothing is more important than to appear to have that last quality. Men judge more by their eyes than by their hands, because everyone can see but few can feel. Everyone can see how you appear, few can feel what you are, and these few will not dare to oppose the opinion of the multitude when it is defended by the majesty of the state. In actions of all men, especially princes, where there is no recourse to justice, the end is all that counts. A prince should only be concerned with conquering or maintaining a state, for the means will always be judged to be honorable and praiseworthy by each and every person, because the masses always follow appearances and the outcomes of affairs, and the world is nothing other than the masses. The few do not find a place wherever the masses are supported.
Machiavelli clearly states that, "a Prince's profession should be that of war". He also says that, "a Prince must devote his time to military exercises." A Prince can attain this in two ways, through action and through study. Machiavelli says that one can study by keeping his troops well disciplined and fit. He can act by learning the topography of the land. It is also important to carry on continual deliberation. When a price studies, he can learn from history and he can examine the causes of victories and defeats of other princes.
While Machiavelli says that a Prince's focus should be mostly of war, he also focuses on his relationship with the people and the nobles. A Prince must keep his people content with the way in which he rules. If he does not do this, the people of the state may try to overthrowthe prince. Machiavelli states, "I will conclude by saying that the good will of the people is vital to a prince; otherwise he will be helpless in times of adversity".
Machiavelli soon thereafter begins to elaborate on how his model princes should go about his strategies. War and armies, which is a common topic throughout Machiavelli's book, addresses strategies for a prince to take concerning his soldiers. Niccolo Machiavelli warns that a prince should avoid two certain types of soldiers when it comes to war.
First, Machiavelli advises about mercenary soldiers. Mercenary soldiers are paid to fight battles for whomever they are employed. Machiavelli calls them, "lazy and unreliable". He says this because they are paid, and therefore they would not have any loyalty to a certain state. They are considered "unreliable" because mercenaries could just as easily be paid by a different country or state to betray you and thus destroy your princedom.

The second type of soldier Machiavelli warns his readers about is an Auxiliary soldier. Auxiliary soldiers are "borrowed" from another country to fight for or with you. Machiavelli says that auxiliary soldiers are even more dangerous than mercenary soldiers because since their loyalty is to another country, they in turn, could defeat your princedom. You would then be under their control, and you would lose your throne.
Machiavelli wraps up this discussion by saying that it is better to lose a battle with your own army, than to win with auxiliary or mercenary armies. Quickly gaining respect is another strategy for a prince, which Machiavelli highlights. A prince can accomplish this by inflicting injuries upon himself. Machiavelli says that he must do all of these things (the injuries) at once and to do them early in his career. He is also convinced that another way to gain respect is through keeping his word. If a Prince is loyal to his word, the people will esteem him. They will not try to contradict what he has to say.
Mercy and cruelty pair up as behavior traits for a prince while ruling from his throne. Machiavelli states that a prince is to be wisely merciful. He says that if a prince is too merciful there will be a huge outbreak of chaos within the state. However, a prince should also be wisely cruel. Once again, if a prince is too cruel, there will be violence and lawlessness in the state. "A prince, therefore, must be indifferent to the charge of cruelty if he is to keep his subjects loyal and united. Having set an example once or twice, he may thereafter act far more mercifully than the princes who, through excessive kindness, allow disorders to arise from which murder and rapine ensue" .Machiavelli's point is that a prince should be wise about how much cruelty and mercy he shows toward his people.


Soumita Adhikary
Pg2

Book IV of Castiglione- The Courtier as an Advisor

The whole idea of the courtier as an object that is constructed comes with the question of what can be the purpose of such construction. This is where the serious Ottaviano bluntly states that the end purpose of the courtier is to win over the trust of the prince. The courtier always has the option to waste his time in trivial things or invest his time in winning the confidence of the prince that can help him to be an honest advisor in the long term. Castiglione’s book four of his text, The Book of the Courtier showcases Ottaviano among other speakers envisaging the new role of the courtier as an honest advisor to the prince.

The prince is a repository of unbridled power , always surrounded by friends who would rather flatter for the fear of falling out of favour. Since the prince, who might be a new prince ,acquires the absolute power when there is no training as such, therefore, it is the responsibility of the courtier to channelise the power to moderation and welfare of the state in general. The prince is as good as a blank slate and whether he is motivated to be good or evilly arrogant and conceited, that depends on the courtier. On one hand , the courtier safe keeps the power of the prince and on the other hand, he guards the natural bent of the prince’s disposition to yield to corruption. Hence, to a certain extent Cesare Gonzaga might be right when he compares the courtier in his advisor’s role to that of the schoolmaster.

In the Ciceronian style of Castiglione, this descriptive work further goes into analyzing how the courtier can be an adept advisor in developing the disposition and positively influencing intentions of the prince. Ottaviano brings in the examples of ideal courtiers like Federico and Count Lodovico whose virtues did not make them ‘’good and praiseworthy’’ only for themselves but also for their purpose towards general welfare of the state. As he further states, that a courtier has to win the prince’s confidence enough to have the courage to oppose the latter’s unworthy decisions when necessary. With the virtues that the courtier has procured over the years he should have the power and respect to make the prince realize the consequences of his actions born out of his vices that might result in the infamy of his royal and honourable family. One of the courtier’s main aim as an advisor should be to protect the prince’s mind from the influence of flatterers and all those who seek to deceive him. A courtier who has such an aim besides his unmatched knowledge in the distinction between good and evil can be safely relied as one who tries to achieve ‘’the best end of all’’.

The basic problem with a young prince is that he does not have any one to guide him in to doing what is right. Those who are there are always to scared of being punished if they end up criticizing any action or decision of the prince. The prince’s friends quickly turn from being honest friends to flatterers as they try to win his favour by agreeing with all his decisions. This further abets his ignorance about himself and gives birth to arrogance and conceit which becomes difficult to oppose later by honest and sincere well-wishers. On reading this section of Book IV , one might feel that Castiglione slips into focusing more on the prince than the courtier’s role in the prince’s life. However, as we read further , it becomes clearer that perhaps Castiglione allows the courtiers of Urbino’s court to engage in presenting the multifarious aspects of the prince and his world only to prove how and why the courtier is necessary as an advisor.

The courtier should aid the prince in his ‘’goodness and wisdom ’’as he strives to work as a devoted servant of God for the benefit of mankind on the earth. Castiglione seems to believe that if the subjects are good then the ruler is bound to be good and there can be an all round development of the state. Ottaviano states that the virtues are necessary not just because of the consequences they have that are beneficial and should be imparted to the prince but also because some of them are necessary in times of war and other crisis. To exemplify this , he talks of fortitude that is necessary as a virtue during war since it robs the soul of emotions that garners fear and awareness of loss and danger. However Signor Gonzaga refutes this by asking if much of significance is laid on the ‘’good education’’ of the prince then what should be the mode of the courtier as an advisor and instructor. Gonzaga’s question is about whether the mode employed by the courtier be one of casual tone conveyed in a manner that the prince understands it indirectly or should it be directly conveyed during some kind of argument justifying the distinctions between good and evil. He also asks if the courtier as an advisor should employ the sheer art of practice to instruct the prince or engage himself in arguments of various theories to convey the right path to the prince. In reply , the slightly irated Ottaviano confirms that the practice should be followed by an attempt to govern the instincts that cannot be deciphered by reason.

Magnifico Guiliano questions the theory of how can the courtier instruct the prince to be excellent if he is not more dignified and better than the prince in terms of dignity. Considering that there might be an age difference between the prince and the courtier it might be difficult for the courtier to relate to prince in his accomplishments. In case of sports for example, the courtier cannot go out of his way to accomplish in the field of sports and also cannot engage himself in the merrymaking that the prince involves himself in. In answer to Guiliano’s point of view, Ottaviano clarifies that the courtier’s instructions cannot solely make a prince. They are supposed to aid the nobility of character and the royalty of disposition embedded within the prince. Giving the example of whetstone , Ottaviano justifies that the courtier introduces the various virtues to the prince but cannot be expected to become greater than the prince in terms of virtue. As an advisor it is not fair to undermine his capabilities as an advisor to the prince because of this since his intentions are noble and serve the purpose of his knowledge, learning and abilities. It is indeed his way of serving the state by aiding the prince into the path of virtues and deterring him from yielding to the temptations of vices.

The idea of the ‘Principate’ in Marsilius’s Defensor pacis

In the Defender of Peace or Defensor pacis (1324), the great theorist Marsilius of Padua presents a pragmatic defense of the existing political situation of his time when the emperors tried to reestablish the wit of the monarchy that was being restrained by the multitude and also where the church was claiming unquestioned loyalty. Like Bartolo of Sassoferrato, Marsiglio too depended on the Aristotelian dictums and posed the weight of the ‘best of philosophers’ against contemporary authorities.

Aristotle has described the city in Politics Book I as “a perfect community possessing every limit of self sufficiency, as it is consequent to say, having thus come about for the sake of living, but existing for the sake of living well.” By stating this Aristotle outlines the final and perfect cause of a civil life: not just to live but to live well. Man is in need of different arts to sustain him and since perfect passion is not acquired before birth, man needs to achieve tempering by going beyond natural causes and using his reasons to create it. It is equally important to moderate the acts originating from one’s abilities so that it causes no injury or discomfort to others. In order to prevent the disintegration of a city owing to civil strife, Marsilius states the necessity of a judiciary or the councilor with a set body of rules to regulate what is beneficent/beneficial and just in a community. The ‘judiciary’ forms a part of the six part structure of a city that also includes ‘agriculture’, ‘manufacture’, ‘military’, ‘financial’, and ‘priesthood’ sectors (Politics Book 7).

The different parts of a city were constructed to attain a sufficient and privileged life and it came through a motive cause called the ‘legislator’. Marsilius refers to Aristotle’s idea in the Politics when he states that the legislator differentiates the parts of a city ‘in the manner of the nature of an animal’ (Aristotle claimed the city to be like an organic structure). The princely parts of the city-state are also referred to as the PRINCIPATES that are of two kinds: well-tempered and flawed. While Aristotle describes a ‘well-tempered principate’ as the governance of a state by a prince in accordance with the will of his subjects for general good, a ‘flawed principate’ is defined in quite the opposite terms.

The ‘tempered principate’ can further be subdivided into:

i) Royal monarchy

ii) Aristocracy

iii) Polity

The ‘flawed principate’ is sub-divided into:

i) Tyrannical monarchy

ii) Oligarchy

iii) Democracy

Marsiglio has made the divisions of the various principates in accordance with Book 3 and 4 of Politics and described them according to Aristotle’s understanding of the terms.

· While ‘Royal monarchy’ refers to the domination of a single man for common good in accordance with the will of his subjects, ‘Tyranny’ is considered an antithesis to ‘Royal Monarchy’. It is a ‘flawed principate’ where a single man dominates to his own advantage without the consent and will of his subjects.

· ‘Aristocracy’ is a ‘ tempered principate’ in which the ‘notables’ (the priesthood , the military and the judiciary who formed the part of a city in an unqualified sense) alone

govern the city-state for the common good. Contrary to it is the flawed principate ‘Oligrachy’ where the richer or the more powerful dominates over unwilling subjects by force.

· ‘Polity’ implies a specific type of tempered principate or regime where every citizen has a share in the councilor functions for common advantage whereas in ‘Democracy’ the plebeians or the multitudes of the poor establish the principate and rule by themselves without the consent of other citizens.

Principates can be broadly classified as being established over willing subjects or over unwilling ones. The ‘Royal monarchy’, the first in the category of ‘tempered principate’ is considered to be more perfect. Aristotle has claimed in Politics Book IV Chapter 8 that certain principates were termed ‘royal’ ‘because they were according to the law’ and ‘because they exercised monarchy over the voluntary’. The other was marked as ‘tyrannical’ for they ruled like masters and according to their own opinion. Marsiglio went on to affirm that the will of the governed subjects play a major role in determining the type of principate.

Mode of establishing the Principate:

While ‘tempered principates’ are established through election, ‘flawed principates’ are established through unfair means. Since the ‘royal monarchy’ is considered to be the best mode of government by Aristotle, he has enumerated the five modes of establishing it in Politics Book III Chapter 8:

i) Where the monarch is instituted for the completion of a single task like leading an army to battle (e.g. : Agamemnon’s election by the Greeks).

ii) Becoming a prince through hereditary succession (e.g.: certain Asian monarchs’ election). It is often considered a quasi-despotic law, for the citizens have to bear the barbarous and servile nature of the princes at times.

iii) A principate where an elected individual exercises the function of a prince. But it is quasi-tyrannical for being advantageous to the monarch rather than the subjects.

iv) A principate where some individuals are elected as the ‘prince’ with their posterity in accordance with the law.

v) Establishment of a prince as the lord of everything in a community, disposing of people and things according to his own will.

The remaining types of principates too can be established as governance over willing subjects (where he is elected by the multitude) or unwilling subjects (where he forces himself upon his subjects) that categorically marks them as tempered and flawed principates respectively. Hence, Marsiglio rightly concludes that the elected kind of principate is superior to the non-elected. This form of principate is also more enduring ‘for election can never fail, so long as human race does not’.

. A perfect analogy is drawn between the city-state and an animal where the principate is compared to the heart of an animal (here Marsiglio takes the idea from the Paduan physician Dino del Garbo, his contemporary). It is considered to be the most noble part of a city that works in accordance with reason and the virtue of which is the law (also referred to as ‘statutes’ or ‘customs’) that manifests(empowers) the principate to judge, command or execute sentences if and when required for a better living. Considered to be the most prudent and virtuous of all parts of a city, the principate is also entrusted with the task of dividing the city into various parts as per the law by designating men of required skill and disposition to their respective offices. This view of Aristotle stated in The Ethics Book I Chapter 1 (“for this ordains which disciplines should exist in cities and which each individual should learn and to what extent”) is propounded by Marsiglio in chapter 15 of the first Discourse of Defensor pacis. The efficient cause of the law, i.e. the legislator of the principate can either be the multitude or few virtuous men. It is their approval that is mainly required to pass a law concerning ‘various ceremonies or solemnities’. But the legislators should also take into consideration, while instituting the principates, that different multitudes at different places and time will prefer one form of principate over the others. So, it is the princely part that has to institute, differentiate and preserve the rest of the parts of a city in accordance with human law for the proper functioning of a city-state leading to a good way of life.

Sraddha Chatterjee, PG II

Roll No : 72

Rhetoric and Rhetorical Excess in Bruni’s “Panegyric” and “Funeral Oration”

The use of rhetoric in Leonardo Bruni’s “Funeral Oration for Nanni Strozzi”[1427] and his “Panegyric to the City of Florence”[1403-04] provides some measure of continuity between the quattrocento Florentine humanists and the medieval dictatores, or teachers of the Ars Dictaminis in Italian universities, and highlights important differences as well. The shift in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries from the ars [rules of rhetoric] to the auctores [authors] played a significant role in establishing interest in the classical authors themselves, as distinct from the practical rhetorical skills one could acquire from a study of their works. Thus Cicero became the most studied among the classical authors. However, the importance of rhetoric as a useful tool of political theorists remained undiminished.The ideal of liberty is upheld in a most persuasive way by Bruni, and the twin pillars of the Florentine, indeed, the early humanist defense of liberty­­­—the importance and desirability of both a republican form of governance and political independence—are also strongly championed. This is unsurprising in a historian who was also one of the students of Coluccio Salutati, widely held to be the first of the great humanists of fifteenth century Italy. However, what is extremely interesting about Bruni’s use of rhetoric and rhetorical commonplaces is that it subtly subverts the very notions of republicanism that he so vociferously puts forth. In constantly evoking Florence as the ideal city, originating from and modeled after the Roman Republic, and as the self proclaimed defender of republican values in the whole of Tuscany, Bruni’s “Panegyric to the City of Florence”, and to a lesser extent, his ode to Strozzi, carefully sidesteps uncomfortable questions regarding the increasing power of Florence in the region, and its high handed treatment of the neighboring city states. Bruni’s use of rhetoric, thus, reveals the flipside of the zealous defense of republican values and political independence, and inadvertently ends up presenting Florence as an aggressive and militant political threat to the smaller city states which were already beset by tyrants and the rule of the signori.

One of the reasons for the immense popularity of the art of oration was its utilitarian value. The ability to use language in a way that would reconcile listeners to the speaker’s point of view was highly valued, leading to the spurt in the teaching of rhetoric in the medieval Italy. The shift of language and rhetoric can be seen also in the way history is perceived. Whereas defenders of monarchical values invoked the name of Caesar in an almost talismanic gesture, Bruni and the other quattrocento humanists, following the Scholastic writers who had evaluated the merits of the Roman Republic much to the detriment of the regime that overthrew it, shift their focus to the ancient Republic instead and carry forward the Ciceronian legacy of defending the ideals of liberty and republicanism. Caesar and Caligula are equally reviled and Cato and Cicero are upheld as the progenitors of the Florentine people. The importance of historical credibility has been long recognized by historians, whether Geoffrey of Monmouth or Leonardo Bruni, as being crucial to provide legitimacy to their deeds and works. Thus, in the “Funeral Oration”, which begins with his refusal to mourn the death of Strozzi whose life, as a successful Florentine military campaigner against the rampaging Milanese, is worth more than tears, Bruni goes to great lengths to ascribe the greatness of Florence to the formative influence of the powerful Tuscan overlords, followed by the great statesmen of the Roman Republic. There is the formation of a particular kind of historiography which privileges a certain view of history as being more conducive to contemporary ideals than others and thus a discourse of civic humanism is formulated which is, as everything else, a rhetorical construct.

The use of a form or a trope with an eye to its practical applications is also common to the “Panegyric”. The panegyric as a form eschews any criticism of the object of praise. It is also interesting that the first panegyrics were written in Italy, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, to justify the rule of the despots or signori who had capitalized on the internal factions within the Italian city states. In a shift of perspective, the tenuous peace which resulted from the Rule of One became an effective substitution for the hitherto stridently defended values of liberty and self governance. The same mode of the panegyric is put to excellent use by Bruni in praising Florence and its aggressively republican stance. Thus the forms in which the Early Renaissance political writers expressed themselves are used with such dexterity in lobbying for wholly contradictory ideas that an element of doubt, misplaced or otherwise, regarding the author’s intentions is quite inevitable.

Bruni also ascribes the greatness of Strozzi to the city he served, thus firmly placing the individual within the city state, and ensuring that the success of the former has a direct bearing on the prestige and glory of the latter. Strozzi becomes the primary subject of the “Funeral Oration” whereas in the earlier treatise, the city itself is the main beneficiary of Bruni’s rhetoric. This is ironic since Strozzi was not a Florentine by birth, but was born in Ferrara. An important contribution made by the early quattrocento humanists to Renaissance political thought is the notion of the intrinsic link between the individual and the city. In what can only be described as a fictional construct, or maybe even creative liberty, Bruni promotes Strozzi as a Florentine as a means to serve his rhetorical ends. Whereas pre humanists like Latini castigated the growth of private wealth among citizens as one of the primary reasons for internal dissent and faction, Bruni, again drawing on the ideas of the Scholastic defenders of liberty, claims that the increase in private wealth can only be beneficial to the state, especially in times of crises, besides being a reflection of the glory and success of the city state itself. By placing the individual within the context of the city state, Bruni also glances at another rhetorical commonplace which claimed that a city’s wellbeing is dependent on its citizens. In what is essentially a glib rhetorical maneuver, Bruni, by ascribing Strozzi’s greatness to his origins as a Florentine, implies a deep bond between the state and the citizen, ensuring that the upright and law abiding citizen cannot help but be implicated in his city’s progress or failure.

Bruni’s emphasizes that one of the main reasons for the success of Florence’s form of government is the equal opportunities for participation it provided to all legitimate citizens. His passionate exhortation to the citizens of Florence to take up arms for safeguarding their city against tyranny and despots is aimed at adult, free males who could have constituted only a section, albeit a large one, of the population of Florence at the time. An entire chunk of society comprising of women, children and slaves is not taken into consideration at all. Again, the rights of the individual can only be reconciled with the welfare of the state by a formula of compromise. However to what extent can the individual’s right be subsumed within the larger framework of the state is not addressed by Bruni, or indeed by the other writers who preceded Bruni, like Marsiglio of Padua. This is part of a significant political problem which faces any government that proposes to allow its citizens power, equality and freedom. The “common benefit” or the "common good" of the state poses questions which Bruni, in what is ultimately a dazzling display of rhetoric, does not resolve. Hence the “true liberty and equality” that Bruni claims Florentines are blessed with in their popular government are called into question by a retrospective review of his “Funeral Oration”.

Every work, particularly political documents, is governed by the historical context in which it is written. Bruni’s use of rhetoric, especially in the “Panegyric to the City of Florence”, which is assumed to have been composed in 1403 and 1404, is directly affected by the fortuitous escape Florence was granted in 1402 after the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti while he was planning an attack on the city. Large swathes of Tuscany had already fallen prey to the Viscontis. Similarly, Bruni, in both the “Funeral Oration” and the “Panegyric” recalls the bravery and glory of their ancestors who died on the battlefield in a bid to protect their cherished ideals to highlight a pressing contemporary problem of mercenary soldiers whose loyalty to the city states were vested in the money they were paid. Hence, there is a definite reason for his stridency which, while being inspiring and effective, also offers a more critical valuation of how rhetoric is deployed to certain very specific ends. Florence is credited with a “rediscovery” of the Latin language. Even the language in which his works are written is made part of the Florentine greatness and resurgence by Bruni. Not only the content, but also the form, language and mode of writing combine to add to the magnificent use of rhetoric Bruni excels at.

Bruni’s “Panegyric” offers an even more transparent example of the use of rhetoric. Unlike the earlier republican writers, Bruni is less concerned with the rise of internal faction as Florence had moved into a relatively stable state of oligarchic rule in the 1380s. Thus, having put to rest the problems of factionalism among the city states [even as Skinner asserts that the remaining traces of factionalism were “glossed over”], Bruni now concentrates on Florence’s role as moral and political guardian of republican values. This masks an imperialistic and expansionist urge which is implicit in the claims made about Florence’s conquests of neighboring city states. Florence’s self determined role as the upholder of liberty and freedom is suspect at best. Bruni in the “Panegyric”, through a masterstroke of self effacement, acknowledges his rhetorical excesses which he says will lead others to accuse him of trying to gain favor of the Florentines, and he thus preempts any criticism which he may face. Despite being a republican defence of liberty, the tone and the content of Bruni’s “Panegyric” is aggressive, imperialistic and condescending towards the less powerful city states.

James Hankins, in his study of Bruni’s political treatises [Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections], challenges Hans Baron’s formulation of civic humanism in The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance when he claims that on a discursive level, there is hardly any difference between republican and non-republican panegyrics and eulogies. The same kind of rhetorical devices are used in differing contexts to express contradictory ideas. A de facto oligarchy, composed of a certain section of society which is recognized and authorized, is accommodated within the rhetoric of an ostensibly populist government. Rhetoric as a construct can be seen in both the “Funeral Oration” and the “Panegyric to the City of Florence” and also in the differences between the two. Whereas the chronologically earlier treatise, written in the immediate aftermath of Florence’s close shave against the Milanese, adopts a more passionate and appealing tone, the tone of the later one is that of self assuredness and confidence. Though Bruni self deprecatingly underestimates the power of his eloquence to do justice to the greatness of Florence, he succeeds and well. Not only does he provide an inventory of everything that is admirable in the city and its inhabitants, he also offers us a valuable understanding of the working of rhetoric and the power of language.

Amava Bhattacharya

Roll Number 23

PG I

Marsiglio's Notion of the Human Legislator

The tenth chapter of the First Discourse of Marsiglio’s Defensor Pacis begins with an assertion of the requirement for a ‘standard’ or ‘law’ according to which the principate must regulate human civil acts. According to Marsiglio, this ‘standard’, also known as ‘statute’ or ‘custom’ exists in all ‘perfect communities’. The rule of law, even though a product of human endeavour, is that which ensures the proper exercise of responsibilities both on the part of the ruler, and on the part of the subjects.

Marsiglio talks about two distinct ways in which ‘law’ can be considered: first, as a natural inclination towards the right; and second, as something that is extrapolated and laid down for us to follow.  The first kind of law is based on tendency, while the second is a coercive instrument or a ‘pronouncement’ that arises from a certain ‘prudence’ and ‘understanding’.

In the eleventh chapter, Marsiglio claims that the principal objective of law-making is the assertion of civil justice and common advantage, and a secondary objective is a security for those in the position of the prince. For a civil judgement to be good and just, felt Marsiglio, there is a need on the part of the judges for an insightful understanding of the matters to be judged. The presence of the opposite of such qualities, like personal prejudices or even avarice, may corrupt the judgements. This is where law-making becomes a necessity; for laws, according to Marsiglio, are free from such ‘perverted affection’, and are formulated universally, with regard to the individual acting against or in accordance with civil terms. Judgement is also corrupted by the ignorance of judges, however noble their intentions may be. While this sort of a shortcoming can be remedied through law, as it contains a complete and comprehensive explanation of what is just and what is unjust, the formulation of such a body of law cannot be achieved by a single man. Laws are constantly subject to amendments carried out over vast periods of time, and this has already been confirmed by Aristotle in his Rhetoric where he wrote that “acts of legislation take place out of things that have been considered for a long time.”

The knowledge and discovery of one man, in what is just and advantageous in civil terms is inadequate, when compared to knowledge accumulated over many years by the mutual aid of men. Law may therefore, be considered the result of an ‘understanding forged from the understanding of many’, in order to avoid error of civil judgement. For this reason, states Marsiglio, it is important for laws to be laid down in writing.

This leads us to the question of the nature of the law-making body, or the legislator, which Marsiglio discusses in considerable detail in the twelfth chapter of Discourse I of Defensor Pacis. Marsiglio derives the notion of the ‘legislator’ directly from Aristotle’s Politics (Book III, Chapter 6) where he defines the ‘legislator’ as being “the people or the universal body of the citizens.” This body of citizens may make the law directly itself, or may delegate or elect another body that has been authorized by the primary legislator, to carry out the work. Any amendment in the form of addition to or subtraction from the laws must also be made by this primary legislative authority. Moreover, the task of publication and dissemination of the laws must also be carried out by this authoritative body, in order to ensure that no citizen commits an offence on grounds of ignorance. It is this body of citizens that constitutes Marsiglio’s notion of the ‘human legislator’.

The primary human authority that can institute human laws belongs to that legislator from which the best laws can result. It can be argued, however, that it is impossible for all persons to agree upon the same decision or opinion, because some individuals have a ‘stunted nature, which through malice or ignorance is out of harmony with the common view.’ But civil judgements that are advantageous to society at large must not be impeded because of such opposition. This authority to institute laws lies in the hands of the ‘universal body of the citizens or its prevailing part’. Marsiglio believes that a greater number of people can exercise better discretion in the making of a particular law, since every ‘corporeal whole’ exercises greater strength and power of judgement than a smaller part of it. A universal body of citizens will be better able to formulate laws of greater common utility, since no one will knowingly frame laws to his own detriment. Every member of this universal multitude can check whether any law tends more to the advantage of a specific person or community, and can protest against it. Needless to say, this would hardly have been possible if the law-making body comprised one or very few individuals. Marsiglio concludes this section by observing that the laws instituted by the human legislator would be redundant if they are simply formulated but not obeyed. Once again, Marsiglio draws this idea from Aristotle’s Politics where he wrote: “It is not however a good arrangement of laws, that laws should be well laid down, but not obeyed” (Book VI, Chapter 6). Any citizen will be more willing to obey such laws as he himself has created, rather than those that are imposed upon him by the ruler or despot.

In chapter thirteen, Marsiglio responds to possible objections to his previous exposition. He considers three possible arguments:

First, the assumption that a greater portion of the multitude of citizens is wicked, undiscerning or ignorant and should therefore be excluded from the legislator. Therefore the ultimate task of making laws should lie in the hands of a few virtuous and learned individuals. But Marsiglio counters this argument by saying that even though the authority to legislate cannot belong to a body that is largely ‘wicked and undiscerning’, that is by no means the nature of the universal body of citizens. Even though the greater number of citizens may not be capable of formulating the laws, it can, at the very least, perceive if something should be added, removed or changed.

Second, the argument that fewer people would be more likely to reach an agreement, instead of a multitude of citizens. Marsiglio points out, that even though it might be easier for a fewer number of people to reach an agreement, it does not necessarily imply that their decision will be superior to that of the sceptics. On the contrary, if the human legislator comprises fewer individuals, these members will be more likely to create laws for their own benefit.

And finally, the idea, that employing a large body of citizens to undertake a task that can be accomplished by a smaller body is a futile exercise. Marsiglio believes that such an argument can be easily defeated. He says that even if one is to accept that better laws are passed by wiser men than by the less learned, that does not necessarily mean that the greater multitude of citizens (of which, the wise men form a part) is altogether incapable of passing better laws.

The notion of ‘law’ is therefore of critical importance to Marsiglio. He seems to have enormous confidence in the abilities of the human legislator – this ‘corporate gathering of people’ – to formulate laws which are most suitable for the life of the collective. As Janet Coleman observes in her book titled A History of Political Thought, “Marsiglio tries to show that there is no such thing as a spiritual jurisdiction, because the very meaning of jurisdiction is the capacity to establish laws which coerce the non-compliant; and this capacity may only be legitimately actualised by the corporate will of the citizen body of any city or state.”

Politics: Book VIII

I

The primary attention of a state’s legislator should be to the education of the youth as their development of character leads to the betterment of the government. And as the whole city has one end, the education should be made public rather than private because no citizen belongs to himself, but all belong to the state.

II

Arguments exist on the character of public education and the way of teaching as the confusion lays between practicability of education, issues of moral virtue and intellectuality being the aim for education; and opinions vary. Education should neither overburden nor vulgarize the mind. As occupation is divided between liberal and illiberal, knowledge, that is good for the sake of the person and friends should be imparted, but the same education, if it becomes a skill that is rendered as servile and menial, is dangerous and is to be avoided.

 
III

Education has four customary branches – i) reading & writing ii) gymnastic exercises iii) music, and iv)drawing. Reading, writing and drawing have their practical purposes and gymnastics promote courage. The problem comes at determining the value of music and Aristotle ascribes the value of leisure to it, which he says, is the first principle of all action. Leisure must not always be filled with amusement, otherwise amusement shall be the end of life, should be for suitable times as medicines for the exertions of occupation. The pleasure from leisure for different people are varied in form. Thus, whereas knowledge used for business exists for the sake of the branches of knowledge related to leisure that exist for their own sake. For this, music exists for intellectual pleasure and not for its necessity or utility. Similarly, the branches of reading, writing, and drawing can have application beyond their practicality as they can widen man's knowledge and teach him to appreciate beauty; thus making a sort of education that is noble. Children should begin with physical aspects of education as education in practice must predate that in theory as training of body must predate that of the mind.

 
IV

Development of athletic habit as the sole goal in children's education leads to malformation of holistic growth. Devoting children to only gymnastics and neglecting other forms of education vulgarizes their character. The state of decadence Lacedaemonians face is due to the aforesaid condition which has lead to the replacement of nobleness with ferocity. Boyhood should include light gymnastic training along with studies without any strict diet and then at the end of boyhood, three years should be devoted to other studies and only after that strict dietary methods and hard physical exercises should be introduced because simultaneous mental and physical labors prove to be counter-productive.

 
V

Aristotle returns to the question of music’s place in education and its nature and need. For the use, he forwards three arguments, as i) amusement and relaxation ii) development of moral character, and iii) cultivation of the mind. But why must a boy learn to play music himself when he can enjoy it as a mode of leisure and amusement being played by others like kings? It's because to gauge the correctness of music and to attain true pleasure that one should learn it with pain only to enjoy it later on. Amusement gives relaxation that relieves past pains; and this pleasantness along with the element of nobleness from intellectual enjoyment of music gives happiness. In addition, it has influence over ethical part of the soul and character and thus is a source for enthusiasm as the mimetic quality of the various modes of music and rhythm in portraying and arousing movement of varied emotions change the soul. Thus music is necessary for education because the harmonious blend of sounds results in the soul's balancing of the passions harmoniously in accordance with reason.

 
VI

Children should be taught music so as to be not only critics but performers too. To the objection that may rise as the study of music being vulgar, Aristotle says that though certain types of teaching and learning music may have degrading effect, one must carefully select the rhythm, melody and type of musical instrument to avoid the problem of degradation. The right measure of study of music will be attained if the student does not learn to the point of being professional players, i.e. playing in contests or being paid performers, but being limited to feel delighted in noble melodies and rhythms. By the same principle, instruments like flutes, harps, etc are to be excluded as they require exceptional skill to play and are merely for excitement of senses and thus have no true educational value.

 
VII

Music is produced by melody and rhythm and of the former, philosophers have made three divisions, which are ethical melodies, melodies of action and passionate & inspiriting melodies, with each having a corresponding mode. Music should be studied for i) education, ii) purgation, and iii) relaxation, enjoyment & recreation. Ethical modes are preferred in education and modes of passion and action while listening to performance of others. Purgative melodies work by creating emotions, like pity, fear, etc. in human soul which then purges it by the dint of excess of it, in a cathartic effect, and are thus sources of innocent pleasure. The performing musicians must perform varied melodies suiting the taste of the different rungs of society. Whereas the Phrygian mode is too exciting and frivolous and the Lydian gentle and relaxed, the Dorian is the ideal mode for education owing to its graveness and manliness. Aristotle ends with giving the three principles upon which education should be based: i) the mean, ii) the possible, and iii) the becoming.

- Shubhankar Das@PG I

The Histories of Polybius: Book VI

Polybius asserts that a state’s success or failure is largely due to the form of its constitution, for the constitution is the not only the fountain-head of all plans of action, but also the consummation of all actions. He contests that there are more than just the three traditional kinds of government (kingship [βασιλεία], aristocracy, and democracy); each of the three types has a degraded opposite variety (Kingship>Tyranny; Aristocracy>Oligarchy; Democracy>Ochlocracy) which is a different kind of polity in its own right. Moreover, while kingship, aristocracy and democracy are the better forms of government, the best kind of government is none of these three, but one which partakes of all of them. Lycurgus’s Spartan constitution is posited as an example. 

Polybius argues for a natural cycle of polities [πολιτειων ανακυκλωσις], beginning with Despotism that adjusts into Kingship which descends into Tyranny. Political order is salvaged by an Aristocracy which is perverted into an Oligarchy. Order is retrieved by a Democracy which becomes an Ochlocracy (mob-rule) when corrupt. Eventually, civilization is wiped out and a political state is rediscovered in Despotism.

In the original condition of nature, as it is with animals, the strongest becomes the leader. This is how the state originates. The limit of its authority is physical strength, and such a dispensation should be called Despotic. What changes Despotism into Kingship is a sense of morality.

Polybius posits a quaint origin for morality: in children. A child is born as a result of natural human tendencies, and is reared by its parents. Now if a child makes no return (of care and protection) to those who nurtured it but injures them by word or deed, it offends all others. Others are offended because they reason (another natural human propensity) that their own children may exhibit such disagreeable behaviour towards them, and so they condemn ingratitude, and generally respect goodness [καλον] and justice [δικαιον]. In this way, a notion of duty arises which, Polybius platonically claims, is the beginning and end of justice.

When a despot is just, distributing to each man according to his deserts, his rule is no longer obeyed from fear of violence, but from conviction of its utility. By imperceptible degrees, the despot becomes king.

When Kingship is inherited over many years, kings seek to differentiate and distance themselves from the masses. They attribute luxuries and all sorts of indulgences to themselves, and generally give rein to their appetites. This gives rise to jealousy, offence and hatred. Kingship is thus changed into a Tyranny. Plots are now formed against the tyrant, but these are made by the noblest men because they cannot bear to live under unjust tyranny.

These noble men who spearhead revolution and whose chief concern is public advantage are employed as the new leaders of the masses. We are now witnessing an Aristocracy. However, children of these noble-men (or their children), also distance themselves from the masses, indulging in avarice and general debauchery. The aristocratic government is thus perverted and becomes an oligarchy.

The people eventually rebel, and drive out these rulers (by assassination or exile), and fed up with rulers, take up the reins of state themselves. Over time, the children of the masses [there is always generational decline] forget their history, and their value for equality and freedom weakens. Gradually, the public is corrupted; it is greedy to receive bribes for individual gain, and the virtue of democracy is destroyed. Habituated now to feed at the expense of others, a reign of violence is produced. This is followed by tumultuous assemblies, massacres, banishments etc. until all trace of civilisation is lost.

Once again a despot is found, and the anakuklosis begins anew.

Polybius tips his hat to Lycurgus, mentioning that Lycurgus saw all this by the light of reason, and combined all the excellences of the three better constitutions in such a way that each power was checked by the other two. In Sparta, royal power feared people-power; the people were restrained by the Gerusia (council of elders), who were selected on grounds of merit. 

The Romans arrived at the same result; not through abstract reasoning, however, but through hard experience. The result of their many struggles and difficulties was a constitution similar to Lycurgus’s and the best, according to Polybius, in his time.

The Roman constitution has three divisions, each sovereign: the Consuls, the Senate, and the People.

The two Consuls are supreme masters of administration from whom all magistrates, except the elected Tribunes (who represent the people directly), take their orders. Moreover, as commanders of the army, the Consuls have absolute authority on any campaign.
The Senate controls the treasury and regulates receipts and disbursements. It is responsible for civic structures (such as public buildings) and for public investigations.

The People are the sole fountain of honour and of punishment, by which two things, Polybius maintains, human society is held together. In matters of life and death, the people are the only court.

The Consul is dependant on the Senate for corn, clothes and pay. Additionally, the Senate has power to recall a Consul after a year of service. The Consul’s power is thus balanced by the Senate’s control over it. The Senate, in turn, depends on the People for the ratification of death-penalties. Further, the People can pass laws that directly affect Senators. Moreover, the Tribunes, who have veto powers, are bound to carry out the decree of the People. In this manner, the Senate is dependent on the People.

Inversely, the People are individually dependent on the Senate, for there is hardly a single man who is not involved with any of the Senate’s many public contracts and projects. Additionally, Senators double up as judges in the majority of trials, when accused citizens are at their mercy. The People are thus subject to the Senate’s powers. For similar reasons the People do not rashly resist the Consuls, but especially because on a campaign they are directly subject to the Consul’s absolute authority.

This interdependency of the three estates brings strength to the state as a whole, and any tendency of any one estate towards degeneracy is checked by the other estates. Thus, equilibrium is maintained. Accordingly, a State of this kind becomes irresistible.

An elaborate description of the Roman army, its selection processes, administration, division of duties etc. follows. In the army, order and military success, Polybius suggests, is individually preserved by the double dose of great glory and severe punishment; desire for one and fear of the other effectively guarantee perfect execution of duty.

Polybius next compares the Roman Republic with other constitutions:

Thebes had suddenly attained great glory due to the valour of its leaders. This was, however, matched by an equally sudden evaporation. It is inferred that its fifteen seconds of fame were due not to its constitution, but to the exceptionality of a rare set of leaders.

Athens is likened to a ship without a commander. Although it had greater political glory than Thebes, particularly under Themistocles [and Pericles], it quickly declined. Athens, like Thebes, being essentially controlled by a mob with its unfettered impulses, could not have a worthy constitution.

The Cretan and Spartan constitutions are now compared. The Cretan polity did have annual election of officers on a democratic footing, but this was only a superficial arrangement. As greed and avarice were really the only thing held in common, public policy was inequitable and treacherous in practice. Sparta, on the other hand, had the peculiar merits of equitable land laws, and utter disregard for money. Lycurgus’s administration excelled partly due to the abolishment of covetousness because of which all motive for civil discord was removed.

Next, making a mention of Plato’s Republic, Polybius says it is not a contest at all, because any constitution must first point to some genuine and practical achievement.

The Spartan constitution seemed to be supreme, but it was not quite perfect. It was defective because although it was internally concordant, there were no established procedures for foreign relations. Polybius makes the interesting argument that Sparta fell to Persia essentially because of incompatible means of exchange. While Sparta could exercise dominion over Greece, it did not have the universal currency (in a double sense) to dominate non-Greek states.

By fact, then, Rome was superior to Sparta, because Rome actually brought ‘the whole world’ under its rule. The Roman constitution which betters Sparta (which bettered all others) is left only to be compared with the Carthaginian constitution.

The Carthaginian constitution was similar to the Roman, but it was past its prime. Essentially, in Carthage, the many determined policy; in Rome, the best. Moreover, Rome was superior to Carthage because of its army. Rome employed its own citizens who fought for country and children, whereas Carthage employed mercenaries who fought for money. Consequently, due to better policy and a better army, the Romans did conquer the Carthaginians in war.

Finally, Roman patriotism was maintained by such devices as public funerals, and public awards; religion played the key role of keeping the masses in check by mysterious terrors.  For these various reasons the Roman public state could not be corrupt, and so it had the most excellent constitution, in theory and in practice.  

The danger ahead for Rome, writes Polybius, is only great prosperity. Prosperity, promoting extravagance & negligence, avarice & corruption, can only ultimately result in mob-rule.

Thus the wheel turns.