Defence of Cruelty: Violence in Machiavelli’s The Prince

Machiavelli bases his advice about violence in The Prince primarily on his understanding of human weakness. He states that the way to effectively dominate a population without being threatened by them is to intimidate them. The prince can rule with a firm hand and mete out justice when necessary, but Machiavelli also advocates the application of moderated violence as a tool to ensure subservience.

In chapter XVII of The Prince, titled ‘Cruelty and compassion; and whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse’ Machiavelli addresses the question of whether it is better for the prince to be loved or feared by his people. He offers the advice that the prince should ensure that if he cannot be loved, he manages to avoid being hated, since it is admittedly difficult for a ruler to induce both love and fear in his subjects. He makes a clear distinction between the forms of cruelty a prince can inflict. While he endorses a single exemplary act, or a series of acts necessary for the assuming power or the strengthening of political position, any underhanded, self-serving act of violence is labelled ‘crime’. Machiavelli does not advocate amorality on the part of the prince. He repeatedly states that it is not acceptable for the prince to commit random acts of violence, “to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, irreligious.” (Chap. VIII: ‘Those who come to power by crime’)

However, Machiavelli observes that vice and virtue are defined by conventions. In chapter XV of The Prince titled ‘The things for which men, and especially princes are praised or blamed’, he observes “he (the prince) will find that some of the things that appear to be virtues, will, if he practices them, ruin him, and some of the things that appear to be vices will bring him security and prosperity.” At the same time, it is important for the prince to keep up appearances. He must therefore appear virtuous, whether or not he is so in practice. That there is an element of deception involved here, does not seem to be a concern, since like everything else he prescribes, this too has the very a specific aim, that of improving the status of the prince by arousing public goodwill.

The duality of appearance and reality is very important in Machiavelli. Though he agrees that it is conventionally admirable for the prince to possess all the qualities human society holds to be good, he also understands that what is ‘good’ is not always beneficial. What he advocates is pragmatism over normative virtue. If the generosity or leniency of a prince does not strengthen his political position, or result in any direct benefits to him, then it is quite unnecessary, and unwise. His emphasis is on statecraft rather than a humane approach. It is in this same note that he argues in favour of violence as a powerful tool.
Machiavelli makes a distinction between cruelty used well and cruelty used badly. In the translation of The Prince by George Bull, the words ‘cruelty’ and ‘violence’ are used interchangeably, but both are qualified as good or bad according to the method of use. Like virtue, cruelty can be used in favour of the prince, or can bring about his downfall.

Walter Benjamin in his essay ‘Critique of Violence’ refers to law-making and law-preserving violence, implying that human society is dominated by the dynamics of power relations that are asserted by violence, either latent or manifest. Machiavelli’s definition of violence, although more specific, seems to be referring to this form of law-making violence used when the prince establishes a new order, or enforces an old one, with the aid of violence. It is not ruthlessness that Machiavelli advocates, but a very well calculated, moderated, and carefully meted out violence. The debate about whether the end justifies otherwise unacceptable means that occurs in Benjamin’s essay, largely applies to Machiavelli’s argument. To him the end does justify seemingly unethical means. Machiavelli redefines the ethics of statecraft in a radical way. His statements in this respect are dramatic and grandiose, sometimes overtly so. He appears to be trying to invest greatness in otherwise despicable human actions, on the basis of their efficacy.

What Machiavelli seems to be proposing is an impersonal, premeditated brand of violence that does not have anything to do with human conscience or compassion. It has an orchestrated, almost synthetic quality about it which lacks the passion that is associated with violence in human psychology. This dispassionate form of violence is not triggered by any personal vendetta or sense of righteousness, or even a taste for brutality, but is initiated for the simple and practical purpose of effective statecraft.

There is a certain economy in the violence Machiavelli suggests; the actions are precise and carefully aimed. This course of action might actually serve to reduce the amount of violence at work in the social dynamics of a principality. It can become a means to prevent rebellion, regicide and delinquencies. Violence here is a disciplining tool, as it is in the case of institutions of law enforcement. The cruelty of the monarch is merely an extension of the monopoly over legitimate violence the state exercises as a political body and social instrument.

There is an element of exhibition in the form of violence advocated in this discourse. There is an obvious distancing of the act of violence and the ruler by having agents carry it out, as if to demonstrate that though he has the power to command a massacre if he so willed, the prince prefers to maintain peace and harmony in his kingdom, only resorting to violence when absolutely essential. Perhaps this is an effort to make the persona of the prince larger than life and very admirable to his people, ensuring that it isn’t only fear, but also awe that makes them loyal subjects.

Machiavelli’s unorthodox views on the use of violence have gathered criticism and infamy over the centuries, and have come to be viewed in an extremely negative light. However, in context, his advice can be considered not only practical but also a radical way of conceptualising violence and its constructive capacity.

Nilanjana Chakraborty
PG II