The Histories of Polybius: Book VI

Polybius asserts that a state’s success or failure is largely due to the form of its constitution, for the constitution is the not only the fountain-head of all plans of action, but also the consummation of all actions. He contests that there are more than just the three traditional kinds of government (kingship [βασιλεία], aristocracy, and democracy); each of the three types has a degraded opposite variety (Kingship>Tyranny; Aristocracy>Oligarchy; Democracy>Ochlocracy) which is a different kind of polity in its own right. Moreover, while kingship, aristocracy and democracy are the better forms of government, the best kind of government is none of these three, but one which partakes of all of them. Lycurgus’s Spartan constitution is posited as an example. 

Polybius argues for a natural cycle of polities [πολιτειων ανακυκλωσις], beginning with Despotism that adjusts into Kingship which descends into Tyranny. Political order is salvaged by an Aristocracy which is perverted into an Oligarchy. Order is retrieved by a Democracy which becomes an Ochlocracy (mob-rule) when corrupt. Eventually, civilization is wiped out and a political state is rediscovered in Despotism.

In the original condition of nature, as it is with animals, the strongest becomes the leader. This is how the state originates. The limit of its authority is physical strength, and such a dispensation should be called Despotic. What changes Despotism into Kingship is a sense of morality.

Polybius posits a quaint origin for morality: in children. A child is born as a result of natural human tendencies, and is reared by its parents. Now if a child makes no return (of care and protection) to those who nurtured it but injures them by word or deed, it offends all others. Others are offended because they reason (another natural human propensity) that their own children may exhibit such disagreeable behaviour towards them, and so they condemn ingratitude, and generally respect goodness [καλον] and justice [δικαιον]. In this way, a notion of duty arises which, Polybius platonically claims, is the beginning and end of justice.

When a despot is just, distributing to each man according to his deserts, his rule is no longer obeyed from fear of violence, but from conviction of its utility. By imperceptible degrees, the despot becomes king.

When Kingship is inherited over many years, kings seek to differentiate and distance themselves from the masses. They attribute luxuries and all sorts of indulgences to themselves, and generally give rein to their appetites. This gives rise to jealousy, offence and hatred. Kingship is thus changed into a Tyranny. Plots are now formed against the tyrant, but these are made by the noblest men because they cannot bear to live under unjust tyranny.

These noble men who spearhead revolution and whose chief concern is public advantage are employed as the new leaders of the masses. We are now witnessing an Aristocracy. However, children of these noble-men (or their children), also distance themselves from the masses, indulging in avarice and general debauchery. The aristocratic government is thus perverted and becomes an oligarchy.

The people eventually rebel, and drive out these rulers (by assassination or exile), and fed up with rulers, take up the reins of state themselves. Over time, the children of the masses [there is always generational decline] forget their history, and their value for equality and freedom weakens. Gradually, the public is corrupted; it is greedy to receive bribes for individual gain, and the virtue of democracy is destroyed. Habituated now to feed at the expense of others, a reign of violence is produced. This is followed by tumultuous assemblies, massacres, banishments etc. until all trace of civilisation is lost.

Once again a despot is found, and the anakuklosis begins anew.

Polybius tips his hat to Lycurgus, mentioning that Lycurgus saw all this by the light of reason, and combined all the excellences of the three better constitutions in such a way that each power was checked by the other two. In Sparta, royal power feared people-power; the people were restrained by the Gerusia (council of elders), who were selected on grounds of merit. 

The Romans arrived at the same result; not through abstract reasoning, however, but through hard experience. The result of their many struggles and difficulties was a constitution similar to Lycurgus’s and the best, according to Polybius, in his time.

The Roman constitution has three divisions, each sovereign: the Consuls, the Senate, and the People.

The two Consuls are supreme masters of administration from whom all magistrates, except the elected Tribunes (who represent the people directly), take their orders. Moreover, as commanders of the army, the Consuls have absolute authority on any campaign.
The Senate controls the treasury and regulates receipts and disbursements. It is responsible for civic structures (such as public buildings) and for public investigations.

The People are the sole fountain of honour and of punishment, by which two things, Polybius maintains, human society is held together. In matters of life and death, the people are the only court.

The Consul is dependant on the Senate for corn, clothes and pay. Additionally, the Senate has power to recall a Consul after a year of service. The Consul’s power is thus balanced by the Senate’s control over it. The Senate, in turn, depends on the People for the ratification of death-penalties. Further, the People can pass laws that directly affect Senators. Moreover, the Tribunes, who have veto powers, are bound to carry out the decree of the People. In this manner, the Senate is dependent on the People.

Inversely, the People are individually dependent on the Senate, for there is hardly a single man who is not involved with any of the Senate’s many public contracts and projects. Additionally, Senators double up as judges in the majority of trials, when accused citizens are at their mercy. The People are thus subject to the Senate’s powers. For similar reasons the People do not rashly resist the Consuls, but especially because on a campaign they are directly subject to the Consul’s absolute authority.

This interdependency of the three estates brings strength to the state as a whole, and any tendency of any one estate towards degeneracy is checked by the other estates. Thus, equilibrium is maintained. Accordingly, a State of this kind becomes irresistible.

An elaborate description of the Roman army, its selection processes, administration, division of duties etc. follows. In the army, order and military success, Polybius suggests, is individually preserved by the double dose of great glory and severe punishment; desire for one and fear of the other effectively guarantee perfect execution of duty.

Polybius next compares the Roman Republic with other constitutions:

Thebes had suddenly attained great glory due to the valour of its leaders. This was, however, matched by an equally sudden evaporation. It is inferred that its fifteen seconds of fame were due not to its constitution, but to the exceptionality of a rare set of leaders.

Athens is likened to a ship without a commander. Although it had greater political glory than Thebes, particularly under Themistocles [and Pericles], it quickly declined. Athens, like Thebes, being essentially controlled by a mob with its unfettered impulses, could not have a worthy constitution.

The Cretan and Spartan constitutions are now compared. The Cretan polity did have annual election of officers on a democratic footing, but this was only a superficial arrangement. As greed and avarice were really the only thing held in common, public policy was inequitable and treacherous in practice. Sparta, on the other hand, had the peculiar merits of equitable land laws, and utter disregard for money. Lycurgus’s administration excelled partly due to the abolishment of covetousness because of which all motive for civil discord was removed.

Next, making a mention of Plato’s Republic, Polybius says it is not a contest at all, because any constitution must first point to some genuine and practical achievement.

The Spartan constitution seemed to be supreme, but it was not quite perfect. It was defective because although it was internally concordant, there were no established procedures for foreign relations. Polybius makes the interesting argument that Sparta fell to Persia essentially because of incompatible means of exchange. While Sparta could exercise dominion over Greece, it did not have the universal currency (in a double sense) to dominate non-Greek states.

By fact, then, Rome was superior to Sparta, because Rome actually brought ‘the whole world’ under its rule. The Roman constitution which betters Sparta (which bettered all others) is left only to be compared with the Carthaginian constitution.

The Carthaginian constitution was similar to the Roman, but it was past its prime. Essentially, in Carthage, the many determined policy; in Rome, the best. Moreover, Rome was superior to Carthage because of its army. Rome employed its own citizens who fought for country and children, whereas Carthage employed mercenaries who fought for money. Consequently, due to better policy and a better army, the Romans did conquer the Carthaginians in war.

Finally, Roman patriotism was maintained by such devices as public funerals, and public awards; religion played the key role of keeping the masses in check by mysterious terrors.  For these various reasons the Roman public state could not be corrupt, and so it had the most excellent constitution, in theory and in practice.  

The danger ahead for Rome, writes Polybius, is only great prosperity. Prosperity, promoting extravagance & negligence, avarice & corruption, can only ultimately result in mob-rule.

Thus the wheel turns.